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SEOUL, South Korea — China has stepped up efforts farther afield in search of support and diplomatic backup as relations with its nearest neighbors deteriorate.
The dire state of relations between China and the Philippines was made clear after details of tense talks Wednesday between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Philippine counterpart Enrique Manalo were released. The two have clashed repeatedly over China’s aggressive sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.
“China-Philippines relationship now stands at a crossroads, with its future yet to be decided,” Mr. Wang told Mr. Manalo in telephone discussions, according to Chinese media CGTN. “The Philippine side must act with caution.”
He warned the Philippines not to collude with “ill-intentioned external forces” — a likely reference to Manila’s treaty ally, the U.S. — while claiming it has provoked maritime incidents and undermined China’s lawful rights. An international tribunal ruled against China’s South China Sea claims in 2016, but Beijing has refused to acknowledge the verdict.
Mr. Wang said disputes should be resolved by dialogue, and Mr. Manalo characterized the telephone talks as “frank and candid.” Relations deteriorated after the 2002 election of Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., who reversed the pro-China policies of predecessor Rodrigo Duterte.
High-profile clashes have played out in disputed waters off the Philippines in recent weeks. Chinese coast guard ships and maritime militia — weaponized fishing fleets — rammed and fired water cannons at Philippine vessels.
The intentions of Mr. Wang, who reportedly requested the talks, are not clear, analysts said.
Alex Neill, a Singapore-based analyst of Chinese security matters and a fellow at Pacific Forum, said it was unclear whether the Chinese minister was trying to cool the crisis or escalate China’s claims but added, “My gut feeling is it is probably the latter.”
China’s official press has dismissed a U.S.-led coalition formed this week to protect maritime traffic in the Red Sea from attacks from pro-Iran, Yemen-based Houthi rebels as a “Band-Aid” given the larger regional crisis, but “freedom of navigation” has become a mantra of the U.S. Navy in repeated challenges to China’s claims regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea.
If tensions in the South China Sea — a mass of disputed shoals, reefs and islands — escalate from coast guard clashes to full-scale naval activity, the Pentagon’s Operation Prosperity Guardian could provide a template for a similar Washington-led coalition in East Asia. Governments in the strategic “First Island Chain” — the arc of islands closest to the Chinese mainland encompassing Japan, Taiwan, portions of the Philippines and Indonesia — are already leaning heavily toward Washington.
Farther afield
China has shown signs of focusing farther afield on countries where relations have not been so antagonistic. In recent days, senior Chinese leaders have engaged with the communist nations on China’s northeastern and southwestern flanks.
Mr. Wang hosted North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Pak Yong Ho in Beijing on Monday, the same day Pyongyang test-launched an intercontinental ballistic missile. Although little information about their meeting was released, it was reportedly friendly, with Beijing offering to upgrade cooperation and communications.
China has long been North Korea’s core supplier of food and fuel. North Korea’s ties with Russia have tightened in recent months, and Moscow is positioned to supply grain and power and potentially reduce Pyongyang’s reliance on Beijing.
Still, Chinese leaders apparently have concluded that Beijing is positioned to expand its influence as heavily sanctioned Russia joins long-isolated North Korea as a dependency.
“I don’t think China is too concerned,” said Go Myong-hyun, a research fellow at Seoul’s Asan Institute. “China can dominate relations with either party.”
Chinese President Xi Jinping made a two-day visit to Vietnam last week, his first in six years. He visited the mausoleum of state founder Ho Chi Minh and was received by leaders of the ruling Vietnamese Community Party.
Party-party ties are believed to be strong. Mr. Xi and Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong signed 36 agreements on infrastructure, security, trade and other matters. The details of most agreements were not released.
In September, Vietnam warmly welcomed President Biden for talks that resulted in deals on semiconductors, minerals and other issues and elevated the U.S. to the same high diplomatic status extended to China and Russia.
As global manufacturers exit China, Vietnam is emerging as a high-tech investment destination. Vietnam has traditionally obtained its arms from Russia, which, because of its war in Ukraine, is constrained from significant arms sales.
China-Vietnam ties are clouded by simmering territorial disputes in the South China Sea. In Hanoi, the two countries agreed to establish a maritime crisis hotline and possibly operate joint naval patrols. It’s unclear, however, whether the two countries, which fought a war in 1979, are fully on the same page.
“A nice gloss is painted over these events as the two parties would like to paint a rosy picture of their relationship,” Mr. Neill said. “But truth be told, they are rivals — historic rivals. … There is too much weight laid on party-party relations.”
China’s dwindling peripheral influence
The end of the COVID-19 pandemic left Beijing with significant diplomatic ground to make up. Pro-American administrations hold office to its east, in South Korea and Japan, and to its south, in Taiwan and the Philippines. The Biden administration has moved to strengthen ties with all four nations.
Regional players in East Asia, jittery about Chinese assertiveness, are weaving a web of multi- and “mini-lateral” security ties extending as far as Australia and Britain. The result: In the strategic First Island Chain, China is losing political ground.
Japan is fortifying its southern Ryukyu Islands. The Pentagon obtained permission this year for expanded rotational troop deployments to the Philippines, notably in northern Luzon.
Both locations are adjacent to Taiwan and cover naval chokepoints flanking the island democracy, which China has vowed to take over one day. On Jan. 13, Taiwanese voters go to the polls, with the anti-Beijing ruling party widely expected to win a third consecutive term for the presidency.
The coming year may also bring headaches for Chinese diplomats.
“The U.S. and U.K. are demonstrating they are willing to intervene in the Red Sea against the Houthis,” Mr. Neill said. “That sends a message to the South China Sea, where there is a potential for unmanaged escalation.”
North Korea, constantly talking up untested tactical nuclear weapons, is also looking restive and uneasy over its dependence on Beijing.
“My belief is that China is concerned about North Korea’s behavior next year,” said the Asan Institute’s Mr. Go. “I think the North will engage in a major nuclear test or an ICBM test at a normal angle — over Japan — teasing the U.S. and Japan to try and shoot it down.”
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
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